BANKRUPTCY LAW: Under Delaware Law, Company’s Discharge did not Extend to Alter Ego

BANKRUPTCY LAW: Under Delaware Law, Company’s Discharge did not Extend to Alter Ego

Bankruptcy Appellate Panel held that the discharge of a company in a Chapter 11, Subchapter V case did not release the person who owned the LLC from the same debt. Essentially, the owner (the only member of the LLC) was a co-debtor, and co-debtors do not receive the benefit of the bankruptcy debtor’s discharge. 11 USC Sec. 524 (e).
As a result, state-court litigation against the LLC owner by a creditor could continue for that same debt, because under the applicable state law (Delaware), “alter ego” liability was derivative. The owner was liable derivatively; the allegation in the complaint was not that the owner and the company were the same entity. The state court litigation did not violate the discharge injunction of 11 USC Sec. 524 (a).

In re RS Air (BAP No. NC-23-1008-FSG), filed June 2, 2023.



REAL ESTATE & BANKRUPTCY (Preferential Transfer)

REAL ESTATE & BANKRUPTCY (Preferential Transfer)

Whether a non-judicial foreclosure sale, carried out under State law in the 90 days to 1 year before bankruptcy, will be considered a “preferential transfer,” and therefore invalid, will depend upon many factors. The court must hear evidence regarding whether or not the foreclosing creditor received more in the pre-bankruptcy foreclosure sale than it would have received through the bankruptcy. The court cannot say, as a matter of law, that such creditors always receive more in a pre-bankruptcy non-judicial foreclosure than they would have received in the bankruptcy. Therefore, whether a particular sale is barred as a preferential transfer will be determined on a case-by-case basis.

In re: Buckskin Realty Inc., Case No. 1-13-40083-nhl, Adv. Pro. No.: 15-01004-nhl
United States Bankruptcy Court, E.D. New York filed March 26, 2021, interpreting 11 USC Sec. 547 and BFP v. Resolution Trust Corp., 511 U.S. 531 (1994).




Where debtor received discharge of unsecured junior mortgage in Chapter 7 proceeding, and then filed a Chapter 13, the Court held that the junior mortgage was an unsecured debt, but not uncollectible, and the debtor should be required to make affordable payments on that unsecured debt as part of the debtor’s Chapter 13 plan.[The property was not foreclosed.]
There is no lien stripping (particularly of undersecured or unsecured junior mortgages) in Chapter 7 bankruptcy.

In re Leonidas, Case No. 6:17-bk-19739;(Memorandum Opinion), filed 6/19/2019

Trust in Comments: Court Holds Loan to Trust to be “Consumer Loan,”​ Protected by Fair Lending Laws

Trust in Comments: Court Holds Loan to Trust to be “Consumer Loan,”​ Protected by Fair Lending Laws

When representing clients, attorneys rely on the words of the law (a “statute”) and ask the court to implement the plain, obvious meaning of its words. When it comes to federal statutes, however, it is easy to overlook the “comments” by the lawyers for the Congressional committees that draft the statutes, or the agencies which implement them.

In a recent unanimous 9th Circuit decision by the Honorable Mary M. Schroeder, the comments to a consumer lending statute were critical to holding a bank accountable.

In Gilliam v. Levine, Case No. 18-56373 (9th Circuit, 2020), the court recounts that the borrower obtained a loan as trustee for a family trust. The purpose of the loan was to make home repairs. the home itself was the sole asset of the trust. Another family member, who occupied the home, with the trust beneficiary.

The home, i.e., the asset of the family trust, secured the loan. 

The borrower later discovered that the due date for the final loan payment was 1 year earlier than she had been led to believe. The borrower was alarmed, and sued to cancel (rescind) the loan under federal law, Truth in Lending Act (TILA), 15 U.S.C. § 1601, et seq., and the Real Estate Settlement Practices Act (RESPA), 12 U.S.C. § 2601. The borrower also asserted a claim under California’s Fair Lending Law [Rosenthal Act], 1788.1(b) of California’s Rosenthal Act, California Civil Code §§ 1788.1(b). 

This relief is only available where the borrower is a consumer. 15 U.S.C. § 1635(i)(4); 12 U.S.C. § 2606(a); Cal. Civ. Code § 1788.2(e). The trial court, Hon. Philip Gutierrez, concluded that because the loan went to the trust, it was not a consumer loan. The trial court dismissed the case.

The 9th Circuit reversed the trial judge. The appellate court noted federal Consumer Financial Protection Bureau’s Official Staff Commentary to Regulation Z (mortgage loans), which suggested the opposite result in this case. The Commentary, for example, stated that “[c]redit extended for consumer purposes to certain trusts is considered to be credit extended to a natural person rather than credit extended to an organization.” 12 C.F.R. pt.1026, Supp. 1, § 1026.3 Comment 3(a)-10.

The “certain trusts” that fall under the rubric of “natural persons,” entitled to protection for loans made to benefit a natural person, and not an organization, include the trust in this case, which was formed for tax or estate planning purposes [which benefit people]. As a result, where individuals invest assets in the trust, the regulation thus effectuates TILA’s definition of consumer credit transactions. 12 C.F.R. pt.1026, Supp. 1, § 1026.3 Comment 3(a)-10.

The trust in question was “primarily for personal, family, or household purposes.” 15 U.S.C. § 1602(i). The borrower was the aunt (as Trustee); the niece was the beneficiary; and the trust property was a private home. As a result, the loan was a “consumer credit transaction,” which was subject to the Fair Lending Laws. And the Comment makes the point: Look to the substance of the transaction. Here it was to benefit a consumer, not a company. 12 C.F.R. pt. 1026, Supp. 1, and § 1026.3 Comment 3(a)-10.i.

For as much as it has been vilified by certain political interests, the CFPB remains in force, and fortunately, it remains a source of protection for consumers. It will be interesting to see if the case if appealed to the Supreme Court (quite likely), and whether it will be upheld.


#law  #fairlending  #mortgages  #truthinlending  #codeoffederalregulations  #courts


BANKRUPTCY: Student Loans Can be Discharged

BANKRUPTCY: Student Loans Can be Discharged

The popular wisdom is that student loans are not dischargeable in bankruptcy. One will often hear a potential client say, “I know I can’t discharge a student loan.”

This is not true. Although the bar is high, student loans can be discharged in bankruptcy.

The debtor must initiate a trial in the bankruptcy court, against the lender. (The case is heard by the bankruptcy judge; there is no jury in bankruptcy court).

Then, the debtor must make a very thorough, detailed evidentiary showing:

“In Polleys [(Educational Credit Mgmt. Corp. v. Polleys, 356 F.3d 1302 (10th Cir.2004)], we held that under the Brunner test [(Brunner v. New York State Higher Education Servs. Corp., 831 F.2d 395 (2d Cir.1987)] in order to establish an undue hardship a debtor must prove:

“(1) that the debtor cannot maintain, based on current income and expenses, a minimal standard of living for herself and her dependents if forced to repay the loans;

“(2) that additional circumstances exist indicating that this state of affairs is likely to persist for a significant portion of the repayment period of the student loans; and

“(3) that the debtor has made good faith efforts to repay the loans.

“Under the Brunner analysis, if the court finds against the debtor on any of the three parts, the inquiry ends and the student loan is not dischargeable. Id. at 1307 (internal citation omitted).”

In re Aldrete, 412 F.3d 1200 (10th Cir., 2005), cited in In re Nys, 446 F.3d 938 (9th Cir., 2006).

Therefore, a debtor who seeks discharge of a student loan in bankruptcy must make a very thorough, detailed showing. And the debtor (and the lender) have the right of appeal, no matter how the Bankruptcy Court decides.

A difficult road, yes; but not an impossible one.


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